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Blank v: Bitker't dealt with this problem. The court held that the
taking of depositions by the defendant did not constitute a general appearance; however, the court refused to lay down a general rule, and limited
its decisions to the specific fact situation by saying that the depositions
in the case were necessary in order for the defendant to answer. As a
consequence of this decision the defendant is faced with uncertainty whether or not to take a deposition that he feels is necessary in order to answer
the complaint. If the defendant decides to take depositions, then the court
with the advantage of hindsight, may rule that the depositions were not
necessary, thereby depriving the defendant of possible jurisdictional defenses. This result with its lack of certainty is not justifiable under the
rules which were adopted for the purpose of providing an easier and
simpler procedure," and it should not be engrafted on the Wyoming
1
rules. 2
It has been pointed out that under the former practice in Wyoming
the defendant had to appear, at least in the first instance, for the sole
purpose of objecting to the court's jurisdiction. Under the rules the defendant is able to combine his objections without waiving any of them,
and as a result appearing specially is no longer necessary. The desirability
of this change is expressed well by Barron & Holzoff in their work on
procedure where they say, "[this] simplication of procedure is a major
step forward. It enables counsel to incorporate in one answer all his
objections to the proceeding as well as defenses to the merits without
fear that he may waive any valid objection."' 3 Undoubtedly Wyoming
practice will benefit from the change and the express purpose of the
rules, to simplify the procedure and to bring about a more just, speedy,
4
and inexpensive determination of the action, will be carried out.'
DONALD

M.

HOLDAWAY

THE MOTION TO MAKE MORE DEFINITE AND
THE MOTION TO STRIKE
When the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure became effective on
December 1, 1957, Wyoming entered into the modern phase of procedural
development which has a philosophy of liberality and an objective of substantive justice. Although our new rules retain many features found in our
recent Code of Civil Procedure, the operation of the rules will necessitate
a change in the interpretation and usage of these features.
10.

135 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1943).

1]. Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.
12. Another problem deserves to be mentioned in passing, i.e., the situation where
both parties have filed their pleadings before adoption of the rules and the case is

13.
14.

to be tried at a date when the rules are effective. Schaeffer v. Schlaeffer, 112 F.2d
177 (D.C.Cir. 1940), held that the question of appearances would be determined
under the old practice because jurisdiction had been perfected under the former
practice and, further, under rule 86, rules are not effective for further proceedings
if there would be prejudice.
1 Barron & Holzoff, § 343 at 592 (Rules ed. 1950).
Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.

NOTES

The two provisions with which we are concerned here are the motion
to make more definite' and the motion to strike. 2 Both of the motions
are found in both systems. They were found previously in the Wyoming
statutes in the provisions that the court might require the pleadings to
be made definite and certain 3 and that certain matter might be stricken
from the pleadings. 4 The federal courts have been operating under a
system after which the Wyoming Rules have been patterned; their treatment indicates that the procedure in this state will be changed.
The annotations in the Wyoming Compiled Statutes following the former provisions indicate no Wyoming supreme court decisions on these provisions; but the court has clarified its policy on these motions by dicta in other
cases. In 19055 it stated that a disclosure of facts could be accomplished
through a motion to make more definite and certain.Later the court implied
that even if a complaint was sufficient to withstand a general demurrer
a motion for definiteness directed at a general allegation of negligence
would be gTanted.0 Still later the court decided that any information the
defendant was entitled to know could be obtained by a motion to make
7
more definite and certain.

The former statutory provision was that if the allegations in a pleading were so indefinite and uncertain that the precise nature of the charge
was not apparent the court could require more definiteness by amendment. Thus it can be seen that the court in Wyoming granted motions
for definiteness rather freely, particularly if the motion was used to
obtain information. It is unlikely that such a policy substantially changed
the outcome of the cases, but it is likely that it increased the time and
expense of litigation by allowing the harassment of an impecunious party.
The adverse party was permitted to throw up a series of legal obstacles
by the use of these motions which would delay an adjudication of the
controversy on the merits.
The rules discourage this type of delaying tactic. Pleadings under
the rules are only to inform the defendant reasonably of the claim 8 so
that he can frame an answer. The only circumstances in which the federal
courts have consistently granted the motion for a more definite statement
have been those in which the pleadings have been such that a responsive
pleading could not be framed. Therefore only when an attorney is confronted with a pleading which is so vague or ambiguous that he cannot
reasonably be expected to frame an answer0 can he be at all certain that
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(e).
Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12 (f).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 3-1410 (1945).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 3-1409 (1945).
Butler v. Boswell, 14 Wyo. 166, 82 Pac. 950 (1905).
Garner v. Brown, 31 Wyo. 77, 223 Pac. 217 (1924).
State v. Scott, 35 Wyo. 108, 247 Pac. 699 (1926).
United States v. American Linen Supply Co., 141 F.Supp. 105 (N.D.Ill. 1956).
Kuenzell v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 96 (N.D.Cal. 1957); Carlo Bianchi and Co. v.
New York, 20 F.R.D. 165 (S.D.NY. 1957).
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his motion for a more definite statement will be granted, but the determination that such vagueness or ambiguity exists is made by the court,
not by the lawyer. Otherwise, the granting of the motion is narrowly
restricted 10 and it Js held in general disfavor. 1 '
There are forms which are appended to the rules and which the rules
provide are sufficient.' 2 The federal cases show that a complaint which
contains all the allegations found in the corresponding appended form is
sufficient and a motion for a more definite statement directed at such a
complaint will be denied. The decisions have primarily been concerned
with complaints for negligence drawn in a manner similar to that of
Form 9,13 but in view of Rule 84 any complaint drawn in the terms of
the corresponding form is sufficient, and, therefore, should withstand
a motion for a more definite statement.
There have been many attempts in the federal cases to use the motion
for a more definite statement for purposes other than to enable the
movant to prepare a responsive pleading; usually that purpose has been
to gain information concerning the case, as in the Wyoming cases discussed earlier, or evidentiary matter. However the rules make available
many devices to enable a party to prepare for trial. The use of these
devices to obtain information is easier and in many cases less expensive
than the use of the motion for a more definite statement. Included are
depositions upon oral examination, 14 depositions by written interroga7
and
tories,15 interrogatories to the parties,' 6 discovery on court order
9
8
without court order,' physical and mental examinations,' requests for
admissions,2 0 and the pre-trial conference. 2' Since the complaint does
not primarily assist the defendant in preparing for trial,2 2 the great majority of the courts have held that the use of the deposition-discovery
methods and pre-trial is preferable to the use of the motion for a more
definite statement during preparation for trial. 23 By these methods a
party may inspect, copy, or photograph a variety of items, including
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or other
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 76 F.Supp. 315 (D.Mass. 1948).
Hathaway Motors, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 19 F.R.D. 359 (D.Conn. 1955);
Boerstler v. American Medical Association, 16 F.R.D. 437 (N.D.Ill. 1954).
12. Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 84.
13. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 9 F.R.D. 551 (N.D.Ohio 1949);
Showtz v. Torrey, 8 F.R.D. 576 (W.D.Mo. 1948); Ruvolo v. Automobile Transport,
Inc., 8 F.R.D. 414 (N.D.Ohio 1948).
14 Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 30.
15. Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 31.
16. Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 33.
17. Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 34 (a).
18. Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 34 (b).
19. Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 35.
20. Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 36.
21. Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16.
22. Wilson v. Ill. Central R.R., 147 F.Supp. 512 (N.D.III. 1957).
23. Turkish State Railways Administration v. Vulcan Iron Works, 153 F.Supp. 616
(M.D.Pa. 1957) ; Kuenzell v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 96 (N.D. Cal. 1957); Carlo
Bianchi and Co. v. New York, 20 F.R.D. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); MacDonald v. Astor,
10.
11.

21 F.R.D. 159

(S.D.N.Y.

1957).

NOTES

tangible things which are not privileged. In 1950, a federal court said
that there is no need to cite authorities because it is well settled that a
motion under Rule 12 (e) should not be granted if the desired information can be obtained by admissions, interrogatories or depositions. 24 Judge
Irving R. Kaufmann, of the United States District Court, Southern District,
New York, aptly stated the status in which the federal courts hold the
motion for a more definite statement when he said:
What is unfortunate is that motions of this character continue
to appear regularly on our crowded motion calendars. If less
time were spent on these dilatory motions serving no useful
purpose and more of an effort were made to proceed with the
discovery and other phases of litigation which really aid in the
ascertainment of facts, litigants would see a more expeditious disposition of their cases. 25
The motion to strike, like the motion for a more definite statement,
will have only restricted use under the rules. It, too, is held in general
disfavor, 26 and the federal cases indicate it is not to be freely granted,
as it is not to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. 27 While the
federal courts have in some instances granted the motion to strike if
the pleading to which the motion was directed contained material which
was redundant, immaterial, or impertinent, the majority of the courts
have decided that such matter will be stricken from the pleadings only
28
if its presence is prejudicial to the moving party.
A finding of prejudice to the moving party is improbable. For example, Wanecke v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. 29 involved a wrongful death
action in which the operator of the airline and the manufacturer of the
airplane were joined as defendants. The manufacturer moved to strike
from the compal'int allegations of negligence in the manufacture of other
airplanes of the same type as the one involved in the case. Overruling
the motion, the court stated that if proposed evidence pursuant to the
allegation were excluded, then prejudice to the defendant from the
presence of the allegations in the complaint could be prevented by proper
instructions to' the jury to disregard the allegations or by a refusal to
submit the pleadings to the jury.
However there are two excepitons which must be considered. The
first is that plaintiff's counsel may incorporate the allegations of the
complaint in his opening statement. The complaint may contain statements the mere mention of which would be grounds for a mistrial. In
such a situation the effect of a failure to strike would be to get the
allegations to which the defendant has objection before the jury, possibly
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29

Milsap v. Lotz, 10 F.R.D. 612 (W.D.Mo. 1950).
MacDonald v. Astor, supra note 23, at 161.
United States v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 141 F.Supp. 118 (N.D.1ll. 1950) ; Hathaway
Motors, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 19 F.R.D. 359 (D.Conn. 1955).
United States v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., supra note 26.
Wyatt v. Penn. R.R., 154 F.Supp. 143 (D.Del. 1957); Schreiber v .Loew's Inc., 147
F.Supp. 319 (W.D.Mich 1957)
10 F.R.D. 403 (N.D.Ohio 1950).
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resulting in a new trial which could have been prevented by granting
the motion to strike. The second exception is the use of the motion to
strike to eliminate allegations in the complaint which are not legally
relevant and thus prevent a waste of time and effort by the defense in
preparation to meet those allegations. Here, then, are two reasons for
the motion to strike.
The rules also provide that an insufficient defense shall be the
ground for the motion to strike. This gTound is here considered separately as it is a replacement for a use of the extinct demurrer. Demurrers,
including the demurrer to an answer, have been abolished.3 0 The effect
of such an abolition was to deprive the plaintiff of a means with which
to test the legal sufficiency of a defense. The provision that the motion
to strike may be used to have insufficient defenses stricken cures this
deprivation.
Therefore, the established practice of the courts operating under a
system of rules from which the new Wyoming Rules have been formed,
shows that there is to be much less reliance on these "dilatory" motions
and that they are generally disfavored. True, they are still available
to the Wyoming lawyer, but they are to be used only in a narrow and
restricted sense. A great deal of time and expense involved in litigation
may be saved if these motions are not used unnecessarily but are kept
within the established limits. The number of decisions on these motions
in the federal courts began decreasing greatly after the rules had been
in use for a decade, and there are now considerably fewer decisions on
these motions. The Wyoming lawyer will be very much ahead if he
looks to the later federal decisions on these motions and plans his course
of action in the light of these decisions and the interest of his client in
obtaining less expensive and speedier litigation.
LEROY

V.

AMEN

COUNTERCLAIMS
One of the changes in pleading procedure that has resulted from the
adoption of the new rules of civil procedure is in the handling of counterclaims.
Prior to the adoption of the new rules, the pleading of counterclaims
posed few problems to the Wyoming practitioner. Since 1939, the Wyoming code' has provided in effect that the defendant could plead as a
counterclaim any cause of action existing in his favor against the plaintiff.
There are two things to note about this statute: there were no restrictions
as to the kind of relief that could be sought in a counterclaim, and the
30.
1.

Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7 (a).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 3-1313 (1945).

